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Balancing Transparency: The Value
of Administrative Law and Mathews-
Balancing to Investment Treaty
Arbitrations
Comel Marian*
Greater reliance on arbitration to resolve cross-border disputes raises
concern with the adequacy of arbitration procedural rules. In investment
arbitration, transparency in the arbitrable proceedings is closely linked to
the public need to review state conduct. This article draws on the
responsibility of the arbitrator to balance the interests involved in an
arbitration. Due consideration is given to the Global Administrative Law
Project, which views many challenges affecting arbitration as the first step
towards developing a global unifying standard of procedure. American
domestic administrative law provides sufficient guidance in determining
adequate procedure. The Mathews standard is of great value to arbitrators,
especially when prior court decisions have implicitly adopted a balancing
standard when reviewing the arbitrator's discretion.
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
"Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice;
nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and
publicity."1
* Comel Marian I LLM (Expected 2010), Stockholm University; J.D. (2008), University of Iowa-
visiting student New York University School of Law (Fall 2008); M.A., (Economics 2003), Boston
University; B.A. (International Relations & Economics 2003), Boston University.
NB: I am thankful for the help of Professor John Reitz from the University of Iowa, Corinne
Montineri of UNCITRAL, and Professor Eric Bergsten of Pace University. The views presented in
this paper belong to me alone, and do not reflect the opinions of these distinguished individuals and
their respective institutions. The errors and omissions in the paper are of course my own.
1. Letter from Lord Acton regarding Newman and the Council of Trent (Jan. 23, 1861), in
LORD ACTON AND His CIRCLE, at 166 (Abbot Gasquet ed., 1909).
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Since Lord Acton crafted these statements in 1861, private international
arbitration has become the primary method of resolving cross-border
disputes.2 In the past fifteen years, states have increasingly taken advantage
of international commercial arbitration to secure protection for their
investors.3  Arbitration proceedings have changed to include matters
affecting the interest of the public.4
It is not uncommon to feel the disdain for "obscure" arbitral tribunals
which decide a dispute with significant impact on the public in confidential
proceedings.5 To a layperson, a contracting state will seemingly transfer
sovereignty to an arbitration tribunal when it resolves a dispute where the
state is a party.6 In Noble Ventures v. Romania, for example, an American
consulting company entered into a privatization agreement with Romania to
invest in the largely undeveloped steel mill at Resita, Romania.7 The
company to be acquired retained significant debt and was nearly insolvent.8
After worker protests ensued and a change in government occurred, the
Romanian government refused to grant any form of debt relief.9 Noble
Ventures, the investing company, brought an arbitration claim against the
government for failing to provide fair and equitable treatment under the
U.S.-Romanian Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).'°
The legal debate centered around two issues: one, whether the BIT
extended to contractual disputes as a result of an umbrella clause, and two,
whether the acts entered by a state agency may be attributed to the
Romanian state." Although the Romanian government lost on the first legal
issue, 12 it won on the second;'" thus averting a large payment for damages
2. Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration-Corporate Attitudes and Practices-12
Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 525, 527-
29 (2004). For a discussion of recent private international arbitration decisions, see GARY BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 68-71 (2009).
3. More than 180 countries have signed over 2,500 bilateral or multilateral investment
treaties containing arbitration provisions. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2006, available at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?intltemlD=3968&lang-l. The cost of arbitration has
increased dramatically since the early nineties. See generally Peter Turner et al., Investment Treaty
Arbitration: An Australian Perspective, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 103-128 (2007).
4. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 45 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, NAFTA 's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle
Disputes, But Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at Cl.
6. See id
7. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania (Award), ICSID ARB/0 1/I 1 para. 2 (2005).
8. Id.
9. Id. paras. 9-10.
10. Id. paras. 4, 12-13.
11. Id. para. 41.
12. Id. paras. 61-62.
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with public funds. 14 The public was able to scrutinize the Noble Ventures
decision because the final award relied on transparent procedural rules and
was available to the public.15  That is not always the case. 16 Arbitration is
traditionally a confidential process that derives its authority from a
contractual obligation between the parties. 7 Procedural requirements differ
under various arbitration rules. The discrepancies between the different
rules may create varied results. For instance, had the Noble Ventures
arbitration been conducted under UNCITRAL Rules, the public would have
had less access to information pertaining to the outcome of the arbitration
unless the parties explicitly agreed to make the award public.
18
In this context, the similarities between international investment treaty
arbitration and administrative law resolve those challenges which result from
the need for additional procedures in conducting a fair arbitration.
Administrative law and investment treaty arbitration share a number of
13. Id. para. 86.
14. Id. paras. 235-36.
15. The arbitral tribunal applied the ICSID rules, which provide for relaxed procedural rules
on amicus briefs and publication of awards. Id. para. 12.
16. Not all arbitration rules have relaxed confidentiality provisions. The 1992 U.S.-
Romania Bilateral Investment Treaty empowers the aggrieved party to submit a dispute to
arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or the rules
of any other arbitration institution. While ICSID Arbitration Rules permit publication of
awards, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rom., art. VI, para. 3, May 28, 1992, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 102-36 (1992), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/lnvestment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/USRomania.pdf (The Noble Ventures
dispute was conducted under International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Arbitration Rules, pursuant to a 1992 treaty between the Government of the United States of
America and Romania). See also Alina Nicolae, Romania Wins International Arbitration with
Noble Ventures, Inc., GOVERNANCE WORLD WATCH, Issue 76, Nov. 2005, available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021855.htm (follow Private
Sector Development, Europe/CIS, Romania).
17. Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment Disputes, in
ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 437 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll eds., 2004). At
the heart of a contract that gives rise to an obligation to submit to arbitration is the
arbitration agreement, which directs all parties to resolve disputes arising from the
contract by arbitration. See generally MATTI S. KURKELA, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 191 (2005).
18. See Cristina Ciobanu & Lidia Moise, Romania a Castigat Marele Proces cu Noble
Ventures, EAFACERE.RO, Oct. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.eafacere.ro/artitem.asp?artCatlD=l&artlD=1977. "The award may be made public
only with the consent of both parties." UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 32(5)
(1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules].
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similarities.1 9 Recent publications recognize the dogmatic challenges faced
by both disciplines when it comes to procedure.
20
This article explores the links between investment treaty arbitration and
administrative law in the context of the growing movement of global
administrative law. The thesis of this article asserts that the shared links are
useful in the elaboration of procedural rules for the conduct of investment
treaty arbitrations, particularly related to transparency. This article further
proposes that procedural due process, which provides basic minimum rights
in administrative law and is embodied in the Mathews-balancing test,2 may
be effectively applied in investment treaty arbitrations whenever arbitral
tribunals decide on the level of transparency needed in arbitral proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND: TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION BY MEANS OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This section discusses the background on relaxing the confidentiality
provision of arbitration rules in the context of the seminal procedural order
in the Methanex arbitration.22 During a procedural order in 2001, the arbitral
tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. United States held that an arbitrator has broad
powers when deciding transparency-related procedural questions. 23 This
section explores the argument that investment arbitrations should be
reviewed in the context of public law rather than contract law, with specific
emphasis on administrative law.
A. Investment Treaty Arbitration as Global Administrative Law
Investment treaty arbitration resembles administrative adjudication.24 In
resolving an international dispute, a party may litigate, mediate, or
19. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitrations as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 137-38 (2006).
20. See John Hanna, Is Transparency of Governmental Administration Customary
International Law in Investor-Sovereign Arbitrations? - Courts and Arbitrators May
Differ, 21 ARB. INT'L. 187-210 (2005); Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under
Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law (Inst. for Int'l L. & Just., Working Paper
2006/6), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GAL-Schill-web.pdf.
21. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
22. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_
FinalAward.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Corp., Final Award].
23. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons
to Intervene as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 15, 2001) para. 26 [hereinafter
Methanex Corp., Amicus Order].
24. See Hanna, supra note 20; Schill, supra note 20.
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arbitrate.25 International arbitration, however, is "the principal alternative to
commercial litigation before national courts. 26 In a contract, parties agree
to submit any disputes arising from the contract to an arbitral tribunal.27 The
agreement to arbitrate is a separate and autonomous agreement that gives the
contracting parties the authority to seek relief before a tribunal rather than
submit themselves before a court of law.28
A critical element of an arbitration is the nature of the dispute.
Investment arbitration involves an investment interest of one or more
contracting parties, usually an investment made by a private investor in a
contracting state.29 Public international law regulates relations among states
while offering indirect protection and obligations to private actors.3 ° When
an injured party brings a claim for breach of international norms before an
international court, standing to bring suit ordinarily resides with the
aggrieved party's state of nationality.3' As a result, the state enjoys wide
discretion and the process itself becomes cumbersome.32
International arbitration provides an advantage over litigation because
arbitration keeps states accountable in front of a neutral arbitrable tribunal,
as opposed to a domestic court.33 Arbitration has the purpose of providing
25. See generally Leonard P. Reina, Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What's the
Difference?, FINDLAW.COM, June 1999, http://Iibrary.findlaw.com/1999/Jun/l/129206.html (last
visited Dec. 18, 2009).
26. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes - Adoption,
Adaptation, andNAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006).
27. Id. at 1340-41.
28. BORN, supra note 2, at 311-16, 1004-07.
29. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Disputes,
Convention, Regulations & Rules, 17 U.S.T. 1270 art. 25(1) (1965) (amended in 2006),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp [hereinafter
Washington Convention] (stating that the Jurisdiction of ICSID extends "to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national
of another Contracting State.").
30. Coe, vupra note 26, at 1343.
31. Id.at1344-45.
32. Id. at 1345.
33. See, e.g., Giles Cuniberti & Charles Kaplan, Arbitrage et Volontl Implicite de
lEtat de Renoncer 6 Son Immunit6 d'Execution, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE Entreprise ET
AFFAIRES 223 n.5 (2001) (discussing the Creighton decision by the French Cour de
Cassation, where, inter alia, the Court held that in instances where a state signs an
arbitration agreement, it must refer matters in dispute to the International Chamber of
Commerce. The Creighton decision, however, does not limit the court to review whether a
matter violates international public policy, or whether the matter is not arbitrable). Cour de
Cassation [Cass. Ie civ] [First Civil Chambers], Mar. 16, 1999, Bulletin 1999 1 Nr 88, 59.
279
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an efficient solution to disputes, 34 many of which arise in the context of a
contracting state exercising domestic regulatory powers.35
The Global Administrative Law Project at New York University School
of Law addresses "the shift of regulatory decisionmaking from domestic to
global, 36 and the "vast increase in transnational regulation. '37 At the core of
the project lies the principle that "separate national regulatory and
administrative bodies" do not effectively manage the legal challenges raised
by interdependent cross-border dealings.38 Motivated by economic and
business decisions, transnational regulations often seek to eliminate "barriers
to international trade and investment created by divergent national
regulatory standards., 39  Global administrative law seeks to resolve the
problems associated with global governance. 40 As a result, a global body of
administrative law addresses the "accountability deficit" in transnational
regulations.4'
Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin argue that investment treaty
arbitration is "the clearest example of global administrative law. ' '42 The
subject matter before an investment arbitration tribunal includes "disputes
arising from the state's relationships with individuals who are subject to the
exercise of public authority by the state."43 Where the subject matter differs
from consensual arbitration to conventional international disputes, 44 a
different framework is necessary for evaluating procedural issues in
investment arbitrations. Too often a regulatory relationship, not between
34. "[T]he primary goal of arbitration ... is to provide the 'efficient, economical, and
expeditious resolution of private disputes."' City of Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., 899
A.2d 523, 534 (2006) (quoting Wu v. Chang, 823 A.2d 1197, 1201 (2003)).
35. See, e.g., Metaclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Arb.(AF)/97/1 paras. 50-53
(2000) (where a local Mexican municipality refused to grant a permit to a landfill project).
36. Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695 (2005).
37. ld. at 699.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005), available at
http://iilj.org/GAL/documents/TheEmergenceofGlobalAdministrativeLaw.pdf.
41, Id.
42. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, at 121, 124-27.
43. VAN HARTEN, supra note 4, at 45.
44. Id. The interests involved in WTO disputes between states differ from the
consensual arbitration of commercial disputes between private parties.
280
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reciprocal equals 45 but between a state and a foreign investor, triggers an
investment treaty arbitration. 6
B. Investment Arbitration as Public Rather than Contract Law
Investment treaty arbitration is best understood "as a form of
reciprocally consensual adjudication between an investor and a state.'17
Recent literature suggests that investment treaty arbitration is a distinct form
of arbitration with roots in public law.48
International commercial arbitration provides an efficient way of
resolving disputes by using contract law to resolve cross-border disputes.49
Pursuant to a binding agreement, parties agree to have all disputes resolved
by arbitration. ° Unless the subject matter involves a nonarbitrable issue,51
courts are likely to respect the parties' autonomy to contract and
subsequently enforce an arbitration agreement. Induced by international
treaty obligations and encouraged by the prospect of fewer cases, domestic
courts presume the enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the
recognition of an arbitral award. 2
Historically investment arbitrations involved disputes over natural
resources and regulatory issues closely tied to national sovereignty.53 In
45. Id.; See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine (U.S. v. Ukr.), ICSID Arb(AF)/98/1
(2000). In Lemire, an American investor sought damages for a dispute concerning the issuance and
operation of radio broadcasting licenses in Ukraine. Id. paras. 1, 13.
46. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 4, at 45.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 70.
49. See BORN, supra note 2, at 185-87. See also KURKELA, supra note 17, at 191-92.
50. Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 933-35 (2004).
51. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(2)(b),
June 10, 1958, 84 Stat. 692, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (Non-arbitrable
subject matter includes any issues that upon "[r]ecognition or enforcement of the arbitral award
would be contrary to the public policy of that [enforcing] country." Id. art. V(2)(b).
52. See Coe, supra note 26, at 1341-42.
53. See generally Guillarmo Alvarez & William Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 367 (2003). Alvarez and Park
state that:
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, developing countries
often perceived investment arbitration as little more than an extension of gunboat
diplomacy. Investor nations were seen to control the arbitral process in a way that
permitted it to be used simply as a tool for extracting concessions from the host
country.
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these contexts, establishing whether a contracting state consented to
arbitration is a procedural challenge. 4 To secure legal protection for their
investors, states have increasingly relied on bilateral investment treaties to
obtain consent from other contracting states seeking investment.5 BITs are
helpful in that they contain relevant provisions governing arbitration. 6 The
United Nations Center for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) documented
the drastic rise in BITs and their impact on resolving investment disputes.5 7
Where there is a contract between a state and an investor, "the contract
will create its own justiciable rights and duties. 58 An investor's underlying
property rights, or the affirmative steps taken to seek relief in the contracting
state's court system, may preclude arbitrating the dispute before an
investment arbitration tribunal.5 9 Investment treaties incorporate a private
model of adjudicating disputes 60 resembling commercial arbitration, where a
state is a party to the dispute.
By signing a BIT, the state consents to resolve future disputes with
private parties by means of investment arbitrations.61 The state agrees to
resolve a dispute arising from its actions. 62 Subsequently, the state limits its
sovereignty when it transfers authority to an arbitration tribunal to adjudicate
private disputes over such issues as regulatory actions rather than seek
resolution in domestic courts.63 This limitation on sovereignty, however,
does not absolve a state from its responsibility to the public.64 Although a
Id.
54. Even after the Washington Convention, obtaining consent from the states is a
central issue in an investor-state arbitration. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 89-92 (2001) (discussing that consent of the parties is an
essential element for the jurisdiction of the Center in addition to the nature of the dispute).
See also Washington Convention, supra note 29, art. 25(1).
55. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 25 (2007). See generally Turner et al.,
supra note 3, at 103-04 (explaining the history of investment treaties, which led to their
increase). "Generalisations drawn from these definitions should be treated with caution
where jurisdiction is not based on a BIT." SCHREUER, supra note 54, at 130.
56. See Turner et al., supra note 3, at 104.
57. UNCTAD, supra note 3. See also Turner et al., supra note 3, at 104 (stating that "[a]s
certain as night following day, the proliferation of investment treaties has led to a surge in
investment treaty claims.").
58. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 80.
59. Id.
60. VAN HARTEN, supra note 4, at 58-59.
61. Id. at 62-63.
62. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, at 122-27.
63. See id. at 128.
64. See id. at 141.
8
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state may decide to refer matters to arbitration, the state may not absolve
itself from the duty to its people.
C. The Transparency Problem
The recent rise in international arbitration has revived the argument for
transparency in arbitration.65 Parties have tried to approach the question of
transparency in a variety of ways. One approach is for the parties to agree
on broad transparency provisions, directly in the contract or indirectly in a
treaty,66 on how to conduct any subsequent arbitrations. The North
American Free Trade Agreement is the prime example of this approach,
where Mexico, United States, and Canada entered into a multi-lateral treaty
that has broad transparency requirements for the conduct of an arbitration.67
Another approach is for the arbitration tribunal to use broad procedural
powers when determining transparency provisions.68 In the Methanex
arbitration, the tribunal accepted amicus curiae briefs. This approach serves
as the prime example of a tribunal using its broad procedural powers to
decide what procedure is due.69 Both approaches reach the same result, but
the second relies on the arbitrator, not the parties, to address how much
procedure is due. 0
In linking the public interest to the requirements of confidentiality, the
Methanex tribunal adopted broad procedural powers in determining the
adequacy of arbitration procedures. ' In Methanex, the tribunal admitted
third-party submissions as a purely procedural order under the UNCITRAL
Rules Article 15(1).72 The tribunal reasoned that the rights of the parties
65. Catherine Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1301, 1301-02 (2006).
66. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Annex 1137.4 U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/tradefNAFTA/chap- II1 .asp.
67. Id. art. 1137 (Annex 1137.4).
68. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, para. 29.
69. Id. para. 53.
70. Compare NAFTA, supra note 65, at ch. 11, art. 1137, with Methanex Corp., Amicus
Order, supra note 23, paras. 29-30.
71. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 29-30.
72. Id. para. 53. See also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 15(1) (Dec. 15, 1975). "Subject
to these [UNCITRAL Arbitration] Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such
manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any
stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his [or her] case." Id.
283
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involved in the arbitration, "both procedural and substantive, remain
juridically exactly the same before and after the receipt of such submissions;
and the third-parties acquire no rights at all.4 3 The tribunal further noted
that "a burden will be added if amicus submissions are presented to the
Tribunal and the Disputing Parties seek to make submissions in response. 74
Such burden "would be shared by both Disputing Parties."7 5 The tribunal
reasoned that the "burden cannot be regarded as inevitably excessive for
either of the [d]isputing [p]arties. 76 The tribunal further held that, even
after the admission of third-party submissions, "[t]he legal nature of the
arbitration remains wholly unchanged.,
77
Various definitions convey different levels and types of transparency in
international arbitrations.7" These definitions conceptualize transparency in
numerous contexts: ranging from arbitration procedures to the parties'
dealings.79 In common terms, transparency is interpreted broadly to mean
openness and accountability. 0 The legal meaning of transparency, however,
tends to overlap with the concept of public access.81 One methodology,
promoted by the Institute for International Sustainable Development (IISD),
advocates the relaxation of four procedural provisions relating to: 1) public
notice of arbitration proceedings, 2) access to documents, 3) open hearings,
and 4) submissions of amicus curiae briefs.82 These procedural provisions
are narrower and, as a result, facilitate the review of arbitration procedures
for relaxing the confidentiality provisions.
Conclusively, the Methanex tribunal erred in stating that its decision to
use broad procedural powers under UNCITRAL Rules Article 15(1) left the
legal nature of the arbitration process unchanged.83 No other tribunal, prior
73. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, para. 30.
74. Id. para. 35.
75. Id. para. 36.
76. Id.
77. Id. para. 30.
78. Rogers, supra note 65, at 1303.
79. Id. at 1303-10.
80. Id. at 1303.
81. See id.
82. INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO
ADDRESS STATE ARBITRATIONS 6 (2007),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investmentrevising uncitral-arbitration.pdf [hereinafter CIEL/IISD
Paper].
83. See, e.g., Paul Friedland, The Amicus Role in International Arbitration, in PERVASIVE
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 321-24 (Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006).
The Tribunal stated:
Less important is the factor raised by the Claimant as to the danger of setting a precedent.
This Tribunal can set no legal precedent, in general or at all. It has no power to
10
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to Methanex, has applied UNCITRAL Rules Article 15(1) so broadly. 4 At a
minimum, the tribunal's decision generated significant debate over the
relaxation of confidentiality provisions in arbitration rules.85 This article
reviews the debate on relaxing confidentiality provisions of arbitration rules
by drawing on the tools available to arbitrators in the context of the four
procedural elements delineated by IISD.
II. ANALYSIS: TOWARDS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS
The most distinctive similarity between investment arbitration and
administrative adjudication is the great deference that both venues confer
upon decision-makers when determining procedural and substantive matters
that arise in the course of adjudication. 86 Over the last decade, American
courts have applied procedural due process to determine how much
procedure is due in international commercial arbitration.87 The inquiry into
due process is even more beneficial to determine how much procedure is due
in international investment arbitration.
determine for other arbitration tribunals how to interpret Article 15(1); and in a later
arbitration, there may be other circumstances leading that tribunal to exercise its
discretion differently. For each arbitration, the decision must be made by its tribunal in
the particular circumstances of that arbitration only.
Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, para. 5 1.
84. See Friedland, supra note 83, at 322-23. "[The Methanex Tribunal] found that this
holding was supported by the practice of the Iran/US Claims Tribunal (although it appears
that the practice has been limited)." Id.
85. See id. at 324. "There is also a broader argument, as suggested by the Respondent
and Canada: the Chapter II arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more
open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive." Id. at 324 n.9
(quoting Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, para. 49).
86. The Federal Arbitration Act recognized the provisions of the New York
Convention, which define the limited grounds for challenging an arbitration award. See,
e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("That is to say, the
court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only
in narrow circumstances" referring to 9 U.S.C. § 10). For judicial review of administrative
action, see, e.g., McPherson v. Employment Div., 591 P.2d 1381 (Or. 1979). In McPherson, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that the agency had discretion to decide whether leaving for sexual
harassment reasons constitutes "good cause" to leave a workplace. Id. at 1390.
87. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992).
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A. Existent Precedent that Applies Procedural Due Process to the Review
of International Commercial Arbitration Awards for Appropriate
Procedure
The New York Convention, the universal multi-state treaty for the
enforcement of international awards, imposes an obligation on each
contracting state to recognize the written agreement by which parties
undertake to submit to arbitration.88 The Convention established the means
to enforce arbitration awards by requiring member states to "recognize
arbitral awards as binding." 89 In First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan,
the Court afforded great deference to an arbitrator's judgment to decide
matters within its jurisdiction.90 Parties seeking to challenge an arbitrator's
decision must "overcome a powerful presumption that the arbitral body
acted within its powers."9' But in instances where a tribunal's decision on
procedural rules prevented the parties from presenting the case before the
tribunal, the Second Circuit refused the enforcement of the award.9
Article V(1) of the New York Convention lists the defenses a party may
use to challenge the enforcement of an award.93 Article V(1)(b) states that
an award may not be recognized if "the party against whom the award is
invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his [or her]
case." 94 In two subsequent decisions, Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp.
and Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L 'Industrie
du Papier, the Second Circuit held that Article V(l)(b) assumes a standard
of procedural due process.95
In Avco, the Second Circuit held that Article V(1)(b) "essentially
sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due process," and
that due process rights are "entitled to full force under the [New York]
Convention as defenses to enforcement [of an award]. 96  Relying on
Mathews v. Eldridge to interpret the scope of due process, the Second
Circuit found that, "due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a
88. See New York Convention, supra note 51, art. II(1).
89. Id. art. III.
90. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
91. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societd Gdnerale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974).
92. See Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 146.
93. New York Convention, supra note 51, art. V(I).
94. Id. art. V(l)(b).
95. See Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 976; Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 146.
96. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d at 145-46 (citing Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 975-76).
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meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 97 Thus, in Avco, the Second
Circuit applied an administrative framework to review the procedure used by
an arbitral tribunal.98
B. The Value of Mathews-Balancing
Procedural elements of an arbitration fall within the scope of the New
York Convention Article V(1)(b). 99 The balancing framework in Mathews is
a useful tool for determining the level of transparency needed when
arbitrating a dispute or enforcing an award.100 The following analysis will
show that Mathews-balancing was indirectly adopted in the Methanex
decision and in subsequent ICSID decisions on accepting third-party
submissions.
1. Mathews-Balancing Defined
American courts invoke the Mathews-balancing test to determine what
process is due and when such process is due.'0 ' Procedural due process is
used to determine the minimum level of procedure in an administrative
adjudication because it "imposes constraints on governmental decisions
which deprive individuals of 'liberty' and 'property' interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment[s].' ' 2  Mathews sets a minimum standard of procedure by
stating the truism that due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed
context unrelated to time, place and circumstances."',0 3 In Mathews, the
Court held that due process is flexible and involves a balancing of
interests.1
0 4
In Mathews, the Court held that due process requires the examination of
three factors: 1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;" 2) "the risk of the erroneous deprivation of such interests through
97. Id. at 146 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
98. Id. at 147.
99. New York Convention, supra note 51, art. V(i)(b).
100. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-34.
101. MICHAEL ASIMOW, ARTHUR BONFIELD & RONALD LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 64 (2d ed. 1998).
102. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
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the procedure used," relative to the probable value of any additional
safeguards; and 3) the government's interest and "the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional procedural requirements would entail"
(Mathews-balancing test).° 5
In investment arbitration, the state carries the cost and the burden of
additional procedural requirements, much like the government does in
administrative adjudication. 10 6 The idea that investment arbitration mirrors
administrative law originates in the theory that investment arbitration, which
obligates states to arbitrate disputes according to an investment treaty,
constructs "a mechanism to control the [contracting state's] exercise of
public authority."' 7 By presiding over the dispute involving the state, an
arbitral tribunal reviews the acts of the state. As a party to the dispute, the
state may choose one arbitrator on a three-member tribunal, or it would have
equal weight in choosing the sole arbitrator on a one-member tribunal.'0 8
This selection process resembles an agency employing an administrative
judge to review agency actions.109 Both scenarios mandate that the arbitrator
or the administrative judge review procedural and enforcement mechanisms
of government action affecting the public."O The authority conveyed to the
arbitration tribunal, as part of a bargain between a state and another party
(whether an investor or a contracting state), makes the state the equivalent of
the executive branch in domestic administrative law, whose actions are
reviewed by an outside party with delegated authority."'
Investment arbitration distinguishes between the rights of the foreign
investors and the "legitimate sphere of operation of the host State.""' 2 "The
right of the host State to adopt its economic policies together with the rights
of investors under a system of guarantees," has come from the tribunal's
105. Id. at 335.
106. Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335-36, with Kardassopolous v. Republic of Georgia,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Arb/05/18 ICSID (W. Bank) paras. 13, 16, 30-39 (2005) (discussing how
the Republic of Georgia became a party to an arbitration when the State reorganized the domestic oil
industry and acquired the interests of the claimant in a joint venture to build the Georgian pipelines).
107. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, at 146.
108. See International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, art. 8 para. 2 (1998),
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules-arb-english.pdf
[hereinafter ICC Rules]. A common practice is to appoint either a sole arbitrator (SA) or a three-
member panel. Parties may also agree, or the domestic rules may specify, otherwise. 1d.
109. See McPherson v. Employment Div., 591 P.2d 1381, 1389-90 (Or. 1979) (Example of
court's deference to an administrative action).
110. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, at 145-47.
111. See id. at 146-48.
112. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 21 (quoting CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentina, 7 ICSID Rep. 492, 499 (2003)).
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decision in CMS v. Argentina."3 The quote, however, may have similarly
addressed the competing interests of an administrative agency to exercise its
powers against the rights of the citizens affected by administrative action.14
2. Mathews-Balancing in Methanex and ICSID Arbitrations
The Mathews-balancing test is inherent in the Methanex decision
and in the arbitration decisions that followed. Methanex
revolutionized the debate on transparency provisions in investment
arbitration when it interpreted UNCITRAL Rules Article 15(1) to
permit the admission of third-party submissions." 5 Methanex proves to
be the seminal case in more than one respect." 6 Not only did the arbitration
tribunal allow third-party submissions, but also in June 2004, the Methanex
tribunal was the first investment arbitral tribunal to open its arbitration
hearings to the public." 7
Arbitration rules range in their provisions governing public hearings.
ICSID Arbitration Rule 32(2) provides the arbitrator with wide discretion to
open proceedings to the public. 18 UNCITRAL Rules Article 25(4) is more
restrictive-it allows public proceedings only upon the consent of both
parties." 9  ICC Arbitration Rules are the most restrictive, where "the
sessions of the Court, whether plenary or those of a Committee of the Court,
are open only to its members and to the Secretariat.' 20  Although the
balancing test is not explicit in the Methanex tribunal's rationale, the
113. Id.
114. See ASIMOW ET AL., supra note 101, at 11 (discussing agency discretion).
115. Friedland, supra note 83, at 321 ("On the first requirement-arbitral power to accept
amicus submissions-the decisions which have received the most attention are those by two
NAFTA tribunals (Methanex and UPS).").
116. See Howard Mann, The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States: Some New
Wine in New Bottles 11-13 (2005), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentarymethanex.pdf.
117. Methanex Corp., Final Award, supra note 22, Part 1, para.8; See also VAN HARTEN, supra
note 4, at 162.
118. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 32(2) (amended 2006), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsidbasicdoc/partF.htm [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
119. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 18, art. 25, para. 4.
120. ICC Rules, supra note 108, Appendix II art. 1, para. 1.
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Methanex decision applied a two-step balancing review, which arbitral
tribunals subsequently adopted in the Aguas arbitrations.121
First, the Methanex tribunal examined the scope of the arbitration rules
to determine whether third parties may submit briefs. 122 Methanex was a
NAFTA arbitration, conducted under UNCITRAL Rules, with NAFTA
Chapter 11 supplying additional provisions. 123  On publishing an award,
UNCITRAL Rules provide that an award "be made public only with the
consent of both parties."'' 24  The Tribunal relied on UNCITRAL Rules
Article 15(1) to determine the acceptance of amicus briefs as a procedural
matter, supported by the practices of other leading inter-governmental
institutions. 125
Second, the Methanex tribunal reviewed whether the broad application
of Article 15(1) contradicted other UNCITRAL Rules. 126  Article 25
provides that, "hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree
otherwise."' 27  Prior to Methanex, NAFTA did not specify whether
arbitration hearings should be made public. 2 8 The arbitration was opened to
the public when the parties indicated a specific choice of procedure and such
choice was within the arbitration rules. 129 Thus, when the arbitral tribunal
121. The arbitral tribunal in Aguas Argentinas had to rule on petitions for amicus curiae
briefs on two separate occasions. See Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Order in Response to a Petition for
Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID Arb/03/19 (2005) [hereinafter
Aguas 1, Amicus Order]. In both cases, the tribunal used the same test, discussed below, but
in the first instance, the tribunal denied the petition. Id. In the second instance, the tribunal
permitted the petitions. Id.
122. See Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, para. 8.
123. Methanex Corp., Final Award, supra note 22, Part II-B, para. 1.
124. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 18, art. 32(5).
125. See Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 29, 31-34.
126. Id. paras. 40-41.
127. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 18, art. 25(4).
128. Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade News Release No. 152, NAFTA Free Trade
Commission Joint Statement (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/statement.aspx?lang=en. Only after
Methanex, NAFTA Commission issued a joint statement that NAFTA arbitrations are open to the
public. Id.; see also Meg Kinnear, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Procedures, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.pdf.
129. "This main hearing addressed all issues of jurisdiction and merits arising from Methanex's
amended claim (excepting only quantum). By agreement of the Disputing Parties, it was held in
public, excepting one procedural issue heard in camera at Methanex's request." Methanex Corp.,
Final Award, supra note 22, Part I-A, para. 8.
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evaluated the admission of third-party briefs, the tribunal ruled on whether
other provisions mandated reading Article 15(1) narrowly. 30
Third, the Methanex tribunal reviewed any superseding obligations
promulgated by the parties' agreements or other limitations on
confidentiality.13' On the matter of public access to documents, the
Methanex tribunal held that "confidentiality is determined by the agreement
of the Disputing Parties." 132  They further noted that pursuant to NAFTA
Rules, each party is at liberty to disclose the major pleadings of the tribunal
"subject to redaction of the Trade Secret information.' ' 133  Often, amicus
curiae submissions include a request from third parties to have access to
documents and relevant information to the case. 13' The petition in
InterAguas involved, among others, a request for third-parties to have access
to documents. 135  In Methanex, the tribunal decided that according to
NAFTA provisions, third-parties have the same rights as the general
public. 136 As a result, at this third stage, the Methanex tribunal evaluated
superseding obligations and the relevance of the transparency procedures in
relation to the parties' choice to disclose information or trade secrets.
The tribunal's inquiry does not differ from a preliminary inquiry arising
in the review of administrative proceedings, when a court must evaluate
whether an agency's action is of a particular applicability, whether a statute
requires a hearing on the record, and whether the agency action triggers a
constitutional requirement for a hearing on the record.'
As such, the Methanex decision was the first decision to assert broad
procedural powers by arbitrators on matters of transparency. 138 The
130. See Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 40-41 (discussing any
subsequent tensions with UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 18, art. 25(4)).
131. See generally id. para. 45.
132. Id. para. 46.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Aguas Provinciale de Santa Fe SA, Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona SA and InterAguas Servicios Integrale de Aqua SA v. Argentine Republic, Order in
Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID ARB/03/17 para. 1. (2006),
available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docl
D=DC512_En&caselD=C 18 (follow pending cases) [hereinafter InterAguas, Amicus Order].
135. Id.
136. Methanex Corp., Final Award, supra note 22, para. 44; Methanex Corp., Amicus Order,
supra note 23, para. 46.
137. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 350 A.2d 58 (N.J. 1975).
138. See Mann, supra 116, at 13.
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tribunal's rationale reflects a justification to admit third-party submissions,
rather than set a standard for when submissions may be admitted.139 The
tribunal's position is understandable. The tribunal had no reason to
prescribe guidelines to admit submissions when it opened third-party
submissions for the first time. 4°
Nonetheless, the tribunal engaged in a balancing test to decide whether
equal treatment of the parties had been violated.14 1 To begin, the tribunal
addressed whether amici submissions burdened the parties.' 4 The tribunal
held that although the burden of amicus briefs was a potential risk because
the parties will be obliged to make submissions in response, the burden was
shared by both parties without violating the equal treatment of the parties.
143
Next, the tribunal considered the burden on the parties in relation to the
public interest involved in the arbitration. 44  Since the dispute had
significant ramifications on the public, the tribunal held it was appropriate to
hear from other parties who reflected or accounted for the interest of the
public. 
14
The tribunal further considered the cost that admission of amicus
submissions would add to the arbitration. 146  The tribunal stated that any
amicus submissions are "more likely to run counter to the Claimant's
[investor's] position and eventually ... support the Respondent's [State's]
case."' 147  Here, the tribunal revealed the possibility that one party (in
Methanex, the investor) would not be treated equally, especially when the
tribunal agreed with the contracting state that "the arbitral process could...
be harmed if seen as duly secretive."'' 48  At the core of the Methanex
decision was a balancing test that permitted the tribunal to admit
139. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 24-34.
140. SeeMann, supra 116, at 12.
141. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 35-37.
142. Id. para. 35.
143. Id. paras. 35-36.
144. Id. paras. 37, 49.
145. Id. para. 49 ("There is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive
issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial
parties.").
146. Id. paras. 49-50.
147. Id. para. 50.
148. Id. para. 49. ("In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus submissions
might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular; whereas a blanket refusal
could do positive harm.").
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submissions from third-parties by weighing in the benefit of the submissions
with the relative burden it may impose on the tribunal and the parties.
149
Since Methanex, ICSID tribunals have adopted a flexible balancing test
closely resembling the Mathews-balancing test on reviewing issues of
amicus curiae submissions. In the two Aguas cases, the tribunals applied a
flexible balancing test for reviewing the admission of amicus curiae briefs.
150
The tribunal evaluated the amici parties' qualifications and interests after
reviewing its powers under the governing arbitration rules and the possibility
of conflict with other rules. 5'
In the two Aguas cases, the tribunal relied heavily on the Methanex
decision to conclude that the tribunal had the broad power to admit amicus
curiae submissions. 152 The Aguas decisions use a three-prong test when
deciding whether amicus curiae submissions may be admitted, reviewing:
"a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; b) the suitability of
a given nonparty to act as amicus curiae in that case; and c) the procedure by
which the amicus submission is made and considered."'
53
The first prong of the Aguas test involves any dealing with the subject
matter in which the public interest is involved and the tribunal's decision has
"the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons beyond those
immediately involved as parties in the case."' 5 4  The similarity with the
Mathews-balancing test is striking. In the context of investment treaty
arbitrations, the affected interest of "persons beyond those immediately
involved as parties" relates to the interest of all parties affected by the
proceedings, including the party itself. 55 Although broader, this prong is no
different than the private interest involved in administrative proceedings
149. NAFTA later set a twenty page limit for amicus briefs. See Friedland, supra note
83, at 324 (referring to NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade
Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation B(3)(b) (Oct. 7, 2003)).
150. Compare Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra note 121, para. 17, with Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, Order in Response to a Petition by Five
Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission,
Suez, ICSID Arb/03/19 (2007) paras. 14, 15 [hereinafter Aguas II, Amicus Order]. See also
InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, paras. 17, 21.
151. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 17.
152. Id. para. 14. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra note 12 1, paras. 4-7, 14-15.
153. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 17. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order,
supra note 121, para. 17; Aguas 1H, Amicus Order, supra note 150, paras. 14-15.
154. See InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 18; Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra
note 121, para. 19.
155. See Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra note 121, para. 19-20.
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where the administrative judge must balance the interests of the defending
party.
Further, the suitability of the specific parties to act as amici will depend
on "the [t]ribunal's satisfaction that [the parties] have the expertise,
experience and independence to be of assistance in this case. ' 5? This
consideration of the Aguas cases incorporates Mathews' second prong,
which weighs the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used" in relation to the "probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards."' 157 The tribunal's review of the third-
party's "expertise, experience and independence" will test for any risk that
such submissions will mislead the reader. 58 Therefore, the second condition
in the Aguas cases reinforces the similarity between the tribunal's test and
Mathews-balancing.
Lastly, the procedure by which third-parties present their case must
"protect the substantive and procedural rights of the parties."' 59 The tribunal
established a mechanism that "safeguard[s] due process and equal treatment
as well as the efficiency of the proceedings.' 6 °  At first glance, this
condition departs from the Mathews-balancing test because the additional
procedure burdens both parties in investment parties, whereby the additional
procedure burdens only one party-the government-in administrative
proceedings.
However, three considerations point to a different conclusion. First, the
tribunal in the InterAguas case did not apply the third prong because the
tribunal dismissed the qualification of the third-parties on the first two
grounds.' 61 Second, the tribunal listed three elements that often work in
conflict with each other: 1) due process; 2) equal treatment; and 3)
efficiency of the arbitration proceedings. 62 Third, where the tribunal did
apply the condition, directly or indirectly, and admitted the submissions, the
amicus curiae favored the contracting state.163
156. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 23. See also Aguas 1, Amicus Order,
supra note 121, para. 24.
157. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
158. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra note 121, para. 24.
159. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 28. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order,
supra note 121, para. 29.
160. See InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 28. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order,
supra note 121, para. 29.
161. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, paras. 29-30.
162. See id. para. 28.
163. See Aguas I, Amicus Order, supra note 121, para. 18. Note that this paper does not
posit that if the briefs benefit the contracting state, the tribunal will admit the briefs. In
InterAguas, the tribunal declined to admit the briefs when the briefs would have benefited
the contracting state. One may, however, observe that the tribunal did not foreclose the
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In Methanex, two parties, IISD and a consortium of organizations under
the leadership of Earthjustice, submitted amicus curiae briefs.' 64
Earthjustice's brief disproportionately favored the interests of the
contracting state. 165  The IISD's brief addressed the issue of sustainable
development in the context of the Methanex decision, clearly benefiting the
contracting state. 166  In Aguas I, the tribunal also admitted third-party
submissions when the submissions disproportionately favored the position of
the contracting state,167 even when the facts did not indicate that the disputeinvolved an easy decision. 168  Therefore, case law suggests that the third
parties from submitting the petition at a later day. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note
134, para. 34.
164. Methanex Corp., Amicus Order, supra note 23, paras. 5-7.
165. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Amicus Submission of Non-Disputing Parties of
Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment and Center for International
Environmental Law (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization!30472.pdf. "A decision requiring the United States to
compensate Methanex will not only pressure California to rescind important environmental and
health measures, but will also compromise the legitimate powers of governments to protect the
health, safety and the environment of their citizens." Id. para. 44.
166. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Amicus Curiae Submissions by the International
Institute for Sustainable Development (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30475.pdf.
The United States political system cannot be put on trial in an investor-state arbitration.
In so far as Methanex has stated it is not arguing there was any criminal corruption or
wrongdoing, it must fit its case into a narrow window between not putting the system on
trial as a whole, and its own admission there was no criminal conduct. IISD submits that
Methanex has failed to find such a window here.
Id. para. 6.
167. See generally Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Republic of
Argentina, Brief for Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales et al., ICSID Arb/03/19 (2007), available
at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/SUEZAmicusEnglish 4Apr07.pdf. Amici argued "that the
question whether governmental conduct is equivalent to an expropriation, or alternatively the
legitimate exercise of regulatory powers, can also benefit from a human rights analysis." Id. para. 1.
In Aguas Argentinas where the tribunal first codified the three-conditions test observed in
InterAguas, the tribunal granted the intervention of third-party submissions and deferred till the
parties intervention two years later. Compare Aguas 1, Amicus Order, supra note 121, para. 33,
with Aguas II, Amicus Order, supra note 150, para. 27.
168. The tribunal encountered numerous objections in this arbitration, so the amicus briefs
added to the cost of the dispute. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, Introductory Note, 21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 339, ICSID
Arb/03/19 (2006). The case involves a challenge to the Argentinean authority to exercise emergency
measures in late 2001 and 2002, which allegedly constituted a breach of the contracting state's
obligations under the BIT. Id. at 339. The tribunal had to rule on a challenge to an arbitrator's
independence because an arbitrator, Professor Kaufmann-Kohler, had been an arbitrator in a
previous case that rendered an award against Argentina. Aguas Proviciale SA, Suez, Sociedad
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prong of the InterAguas balancing test is met when third-party submissions
do not burden the contracting state.
3. Mathews-Balancing Test in the Enforcement of an Investment
Award
Domestic courts do not appear to have reviewed amicus curiae decisions
in Methanex and related cases. 169 This trend is not likely to continue if
arbitrators rely on broad procedural powers to relax confidentiality
requirements. Case law in the United States suggests that an arbitrator's
reliance on broad procedural powers, as manifested in Methanex, will be
upheld unless other contradicting issues appear. 70
In the American administrative framework, constitutionally-mandated
procedural due process safeguards the rights of a private party before a
governmental agency.71 The New York Convention does not have the
supreme authority of the U.S. Constitution, but the Convention retains an
overwhelming binding authority on subsequent arbitrations and court
challenges.' 72  The Convention has the ultimate binding effect of a
multiparty international treaty, even when other treaties add additional
specific obligations, e.g., multilateral treaties such as NAFTA, or bilateral
agreements such as BITs.'73
The Second Circuit reviewed the exercise of arbitrators' broad
procedural powers for any violation of procedural due process. 7 4 Outside of
the United States, this review may be equally relevant where a tribunal will
consider: 1) the private interests of the parties, 2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest, and 3) the burden that the relaxation of
General De Aguas de Barcelona SA v. Argentine Republic, Decision on the Proposal for the
Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Arb/03/19 (2007) para. 12.
169. See generally MCLACHLAN, supra note 55, at 57-60. Note that the tribunal decision in
Methanex to admit third party submissions was not challenged in a court; also, the decisions in UPS
v. Canada and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic were not challenged either. Id.
170. Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co. v. Societ6 G~nerale de L'Industrie du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Although the Convention recognizes that an award may not
be enforced where predicated on a subject matter outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction, it does not
sanction second-guessing the arbitrator's construction of the parties' agreement."). Id.
171. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 471 (1986).
172. See generally JAN VAN DEN BERG, TiHE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981).
173. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, 135-36.
174. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Avco and
Parsons & Whittemore cases.
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The link between investment treaty arbitration and administrative law is
also relevant when examining the subject of arbitrator bias and the
permeation of American values. In these two contexts, domestic
administrative law may be of additional assistance.
A. Bias
In both investment treaty arbitration and administrative law, courts will
not reverse a decision on the appearance of impartiality. 7 6  The courts'
deference to tribunals becomes problematic when tribunals rely on the
rationale in Methanex to broaden their procedural power. 1"7 Administrative
law, which emphasizes a wall of separation between the agency and the
administrative judge,178 provides a useful solution to the potential problem of
arbitrator's bias.
175. The issue of confidentiality persistently emerges in international arbitration.
Specific rules have been applied by the signatory states to NAFTA where the United
States and Canada make pleadings publicly available pursuant to freedom of information
legislation. Other states such as Argentina have made public the names of counsel and
have indicated they will publish pleadings. This is a very different from the traditions of
commercial arbitration where confidentiality is still presumed to reign. However, the
presumption has little basis in concrete rules and the fortress of confidentiality has often
turned out to be a castle of cards, even in commercial cases.
Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the
Dolphin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217,
226 (Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006).
176. Compare Andrews v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 623 P.2d 151, 156 (Cal. 1981),
with Bernard Hanotiau, Misdeeds, Wrongful Conduct and Illegality in Arbitral Awards, in
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
CONGRESS 261 (Jan van den Berg ed., 2002). While the appearance of impartiality is not
grounds for striking down an award, a court will look at favoritism and ex parte as sufficient
ground to refuse enforcement of an award. Id. at 264.
177. InterAguas, Amicus Order, supra note 134, para. 14. See also Aguas I, Amicus Order,
supra note 121, paras. 4-7, 14-15.
178. See generally Jeff Bush & Kristal Knutson, The Building and Maintenance of "Ethics
Walls" in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2004).
The chief characteristic of the agency control organizational structure is that the
administrative agency or board consistently maintains control and oversight over all these
competing functions.... Citizens outside of the bureaucracy often perceive a maze of
23
Marian: Balancing Transparency: The Value of Administrative Law and <em>M
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010
First, both fields confront the challenge of giving their respective
decision-makers the appropriate amount of decisional independence.
179
Every arbitrator must remain independent of the parties involved in the
arbitration, regardless of whether the parties directly appoint the arbitrator,
as it is the case with a three-member tribunal, or whether the parties jointly
appoint the arbitrator, as it is the case with a sole arbitrator. 8 ° The clearest
instance of bias in the conduct of an arbitration is the arbitrator's
undisclosed financial interest.18' The bias from undisclosed financial
interest may extend to the arbitrator's prior involvement in the parties'
dispute. 82 Upon a challenge to the validity of an arbitration award, courts
have generally rejected claims that an arbitrator's conduct alone was
evidence of improper bias. 183  Courts have held that an arbitrator "may
develop an opinion during the course of the hearing and express it.
' 184
Administrative law appears to allow judges to maintain some bias in
their decision-making. In Andrews, the Califomia Supreme Court held that
the mere appearance of bias will not disqualify a judicial officer. 85  The
court stated that impartiality does not mean indifference. 186  Absent "the
actual existence of bias," the court would not reverse a decision by an
administrative law judge on grounds of bias.'87
Unlike judges, arbitrators compete in an adjudicatory service to provide
"an efficacious and economically viable service for their clients."'818 When
reviewing a commercial award on a challenge to the arbitrator's
lawyers and suspect that all government employees are in cahoots with one another. This
sentiment is particularly prevalent where the hearing official works directly within the
agency. In these cases, the agency's control structure makes ethics walls particularly
important, because no apparent organizational barrier exists.
Id. at 8.
179. Compare ICC Rules, supra note 108, art. 7, with Andrews, 623 P.2d at 157-58.
180. "Every arbitrator must be and remain independent of the parties involved in the
arbitration." ICC Rules, supra note 108, art.7(l).
181. See BORN, supra note 2, at 1517 (referring to Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d
1197 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
182. Id. at 868 (referring to Veritas Shipping Corp. v. Anglo-Canadian Cement, Ltd., [1966] 1
Lloyd's List L. Rep. 76 (Q.B. 1965)).
183. Id. at 873 (referring to Judgment of 24 Nov. 1994, XXI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 635 (Rotterdam
Rechtbank) (1996)).
184. Id. (citing Hayne, Miller& Farmi, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F.Supp. 949 (E.D. Wis. 1995)).
185. Andrews v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 623 P.2d 151, 155-57 (Cal. 1981).
186. "The right to an impartial trier of fact is not synonymous with the claimed right to a trier
completely indifferent to the general subject matter of the claim before him." Id. at 155.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 19, at 148. See also BORN, supra note 2, at 1467-68.
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independence, the court will often apply national standards to determine
impartiality.'89
Administrative law, at least in the United States, explicitly mandates
that an agency shall separate its prosecutory and adjudicatory functions.' 90
A similar separation of interests is necessary for the preservation of a
sustainable environment for arbitration. While tribunals rely on broad
powers to determine procedure, a "wall of separation" must be reinforced
between the interests of the client, which selected the arbitrator, and the
duties of the arbitrator to the tribunal. Enforcing a "wall" between the
arbitrator and the client may be achieved by greater reliance on arbitration
institutions to appoint arbitrators on behalf of the parties.' 9'
B. Obfuscation
Complete judicialization of international commercial arbitrations is
neither possible nor desired. The international legal community is rightfully
concerned that international arbitration has become an American-style
trial. 92 The transformation of arbitration procedures towards what has been
called "Americanization" of international business law includes the use of
broad evidentiary rules and cross-examination of witnesses.' 93
The viable concern that arbitration may develop into an American-style
trial ought not to obfuscate the point that arbitrators have a duty to the public
189. Id. at 1468-69. United States courts have previously applied a standard of whether
"reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the
arbitration" to determine an arbitrator's partiality. Id. at 1469 (citing Morelite Constr. Corp. v.
N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters' Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984)). One must note an
important distinction between arbitrators and judges (including administrative judges): "[the]
'appearance of impartiality' ground of disqualification for judges does not apply to arbitrators .... "
Id. at 1469 (citing Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir.
2002)). However, one shall also note that the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the
precise standards of impartiality for arbitrators. Id. at 1469-70.
190. "'And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.' No matter how strong and
thick the walls are, the crucial player in this process is the hearing official." Bush & Knutson, supra
note 178, at 18.
191. Many arbitration rules provide for institutional appointment in multi-party arbitrations.
See generally International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules Art. 10(2) (1997), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules-arb-english.pdf.
192. See MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 20 (1997).
193. See KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES TO
THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (Julian Lew ed., 2003).
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at large when issues of public interest arise in an investment dispute.194
Most of the examples drawn in this paper rely on American domestic
administrative law. 195 As the world moves toward a more integrated body of
administrative law, the outcry against an American legal framework should
not belittle the legitimate contributions that American jurisprudence has
made to the development of an international body of law.
C. Strengthening the Link
In revising their arbitration rules, institutions have generally kept up
with any new issues or contentions emerging in the academic discourse or
local courts. 19 6  ICSID, the institution most affected by the Methanex
decision because its arbitration provisions apply solely to investment
arbitrations, amended its arbitration rules in 2006 to permit tribunals to
admit third-party submissions. 97 A pressing debate currently ensues at
UNCITRAL over whether UNCITRAL Rules should be relaxed to include
amicus curiae briefs.19
8
Where arbitration rules are not revised to account directly for the
Methanex decision, these rules should examine the broad procedural powers
available to arbitrators. Those provisions of the rules that confer broad
authority to arbitrators should account for all of the defenses in Article V(1)
of the New York Convention that permit a reviewing court to invalidate an
award. The travaux preparatoire to Article 15(1), relied upon by the
Methanex tribunal, articulates the flexibility in the conduct of the
194. Id.
195. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 40, at 16.
196. ICC revised its arbitration rules in 1998, by adopting art. 10(2) after the French Cour de
Cassation held, in Dutco, that the parties enjoyed a right to equality and such right could not be
waived until after the dispute has started. See YvEs DERAINS & ERIC SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE
NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 170 (1998).
197. ICSID Convention: Rules and Regulations, April 2006, art. 37(2),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR English-findal.pdf (The revised Rule 37(2) provides
the guidelines by which a tribunal may admit third-party submissions "after consulting both
parties... a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the 'non-disputing
party') to file a written submission with the Tribunal."). Id.
198. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and
Conciliation on the Work, 47th sess., 95, 99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/641 (Sept. 10-14, 2007),
available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/VO7/870/53/PDF/V0787053.pdfOpenElement
(deferring the heated discussion on transparency to later sessions); see also James E. Castello,
Report on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Working Group, 63 DIsP. RESOL. J. 7 (2008) ("Following
significant discussion, the Working Group deferred detailed consideration of these proposals
pending completion of its work on other revisions and receipt of further guidance from the
Commission on the transparency issue.").
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proceedings and the reliance on the expertise of the arbitrators as the
hallmarks of arbitration.199 Administrative law may provide successful
guidance to prescribe the level of flexibility permitted in arbitrators'
decision-making.
IV. CONCLUSION
After the Methanex decision, what standard should the arbitrators use
in exercising broad procedural powers when relaxing confidentiality
provisions for the conduct of an arbitration?
The Global Administrative Law Project may provide the relevant
starting point. Understanding investment treaty arbitrations through
administrative law reconciles the dogmatic difference between contract law
and public international law.200 American case law contains two relevant
decisions that link procedural due process to international commercial
arbitration l20 Examining investment arbitration as global administrative law
provides a valuable insight on how to address the desirability of additional
procedural provisions, such as transparency, when superseding interests of
the public are involved. With the Mathews-balancing test, American
jurisprudence provides a useful tool to balance the interests demanding
greater transparency in the administration of an arbitration and accounting
for the broad procedural powers available to an arbitrator.
199. Report of the Secretary-General: Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for Optional Use
in Ad Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)(addendum):
Commentary on the Draft UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in 7 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW YEARBOOK 172, para 1. (1975), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1976-e/yb_ 1976_e.pdf.
200. See supra text accompanying note 47.
201. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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